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Abstract 
 
There is an extensive literature on modelling 
cascading effects in Critical Infrastructures (CIs). 
Concerning the cascading impacts of a cyber-attack 
upon other CIs, a detailed scenario analysis done by 
the Norwegian Directorate of Civil Protection 
concludes that a considerable impact could be 
achieved. However, the analysis admits that the 
probability of the attack would be very low, since it 
would require considerable expertise and resources. 
We argue that a smart attacker could exploit existing 
knowledge on cascading impacts to plan for 
perfidiously-timed cyber-attacks requiring low 
resources that would achieve a significant disruption 
of CIs. To illustrate our point, we build and simulate a 
highly-aggregated system dynamics model using 
estimates of disruptions effects across CIs taken from 
the literature. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Critical Infrastructures (CIs) are resources that are 
essential for the performance of society, including its 
economy and its security, here understood as safety of 
citizens and security of society’s assets. Different 
countries might have slightly different definitions of 
CIs. However, there is consensus that CIs include 
government, society’s ICT (information and 
communication technology); financial sector; energy 
supply; water supply; transportation systems; health 
sector; and security services (police, military). 
CIs are exposed to natural hazards and man-made 
hazards (human errors, human malignity). Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (CIP) embodies the 
management of risk assessment, risk mitigation, 
preparedness, response and recovery against serious 
incidents threatening the critical infrastructure of a 
region or nation. 
CIs are highly interconnected and, hence, 
interdependent: a disruption diminishing the capacity 
of a CI affects other CIs through cascading effects 
(propagation of the disruption to other CIs that need 
services from the disrupted CI).  
Society depends increasingly on the well-
functioning of its information and communication 
infrastructure. For example, a vulnerability analysis 
[9] conducted by the Norwegian Directorate for Civil 
Protection (DSB) concluded that a cyber-attack 
causing complete disruption of the ICT CI’s transport 
network in Norway would have:  
• high impact on security CI;  
• high impact on financial CI;  
• high impact on railways and airline traffic, 
and moderate impact on other transport CIs;  
• low impact on water CI; 
• low impact on energy CI; but then secondary 
cascading effects from minor disruptions on 
energy infrastructure would increase 
significantly the disruption of ICT CI; 
• moderate impact on health CI. 
The aggregate impact of such a cyber-attack on 
ICT CI in Norway would be considerable in terms of 
financial costs (around one billion euro, or 1.2 billion 
US dollars, which is about 3.5 per cent of Norway’s 
gross national product). The estimate is probably 
conservative, since the analysis in the report concludes 
that the ICT CI will not recover completely for about 
one month. The event may cause social and political 
instability in addition, with unpredictable long-term 
consequences.  
The dynamics of interconnected CIs are extremely 
complex. There are numerous approaches for 
modelling cascading effects; a recent extensive review 
[10] enumerates six modelling categories, viz. 
empirical approaches, agent-based approaches, system 
dynamics-based approaches, economic theory based 
approaches, network based approaches, and others. 
The author concludes that none of the existing 
approaches is completely satisfactory: key challenges 
are difficulties of data access and collection, or lack of 
precise data; lack of integration of different modelling 
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approaches, yielding conflicting outcomes; validation 
problems owing to insufficient or unreliable historical 
data, and lack of standards for relevant metrics.  
Furthermore, most models’ predictions rarely can 
be validated by comparison with real data; few models 
of interconnected CIs correspond fully to observed 
scenarios [10]. 
Rather than focusing on detailed models with a 
high number of variables and relations between them, 
we argue that highly aggregated models, with simple 
model structure, have several advantages. They are 
simple to understand, they concentrate on a few 
essential factors and they request only few parameters 
with down-to-earth relations among them. The 
estimate of such relations admittedly relies on expert 
opinion. But the attractiveness of a simple and easy to 
understand model, and the fact that only few 
parameters need to be estimated, facilitate a focused 
discussion and a potentially more reliable estimate in 
a Delphi [8] or a wisdom of the crowd approach [12] 
in conjunction with model iterations.  
Such a simulation model would allow to analyse 
the impacts of cascading effects. Specifically, it would 
allow checking the robustness of a CI system towards 
series of disruptions, whether arising by chance or 
planned by a malignant agent, if they are timed and 
targeted at the weakest links, arising dynamically, as 
the cascading effects propagate. 
An interesting high-level system dynamics 
modelling approach for interconnected CIs has been 
recently proposed by Canzani [2]. Canzani considers a 
system of systems consisting of any number of 
interdependent CIs for the objective to analyse the 
performance level of the CIs when disruptions caused 
by natural or man-made disasters happen. 
In Canzani’s model, each CI is represented as a 
structure of three stocks, viz. ‘Running operations’, 
‘Down operations’ and ‘Recovered operations’, 
describing three possible states for a given CI. The 
stock ‘Running operations’ represents the number of 
active operations in a given CI. The stock ‘Down 
operations’ represents the number of not running 
operations, owing to a disruption; such disruption 
could have been caused directly by a natural or a man-
made event. The stock ‘Recovering operations’ 
represents a state of transition to ‘Running operations’, 
counted as the number of running operations and – but 
for some unexplained reason – not being susceptible 
to disruptions.  
Interesting as it is, Canzani’s approach suffers 
from three major deficiencies. 
First, Canzani’s model is structured as an epidemic 
model known as SIRS, where S refers to a stock of 
susceptible, I to a stock of infected and R to a stock of 
recovering individuals. Canzani argues that the stock 
“Running operations” is analogous to a stock of 
susceptible individuals; that the stock of “Down 
operations” is analogous to a stock of infected 
individuals; and, finally, that the stock of “Recovering 
operations” is analogous to a stock of individuals 
recovering from infection.  
To deserve its name, an epidemic model must 
include infections transmitted through contacts 
between the I and the S state. However, there is no 
such “infection” from “Down operations” to “Running 
operations” in Canzani’s model – nor can it be. The 
process causing running operations to cease operating 
is not an internal transmission of kind of “infections” 
affecting the state of “Down operations” to the state of 
“Running operations”. Rather, the process causing 
running operations to cease operating is an external 
disruption: either a direct disruption to the particular 
CI or indirect disruptions in terms of reduced service 
from other disrupted CIs through cascading effects. 
As a corollary, since Canzani’s model does not 
describe a process analogous to the spread of an 
epidemic, the stock of “Recovering operations” – 
which logically would be a state “immune” to 
disruptions – does not make sense. 
Second, Canzani’s unit of measure for CI 
operations is the number of operations in each of the 
states. This unit of measure, we believe, has been 
proposed in analogy to the stocks in a SIRS model, 
where the unit of measure is the number of individuals 
in the corresponding state (e.g., the number of 
susceptible, the number of infected and the number of 
recovering individuals). The proposed unit of measure 
for CIs – the number of operations in each of the states 
– is an artificial construct with hardly a 
correspondence in practice. 
Third and last, but not least, Canzani’s system 
dynamics model has not been subjected to tests to 
create confidence on the model’s verifiability and 
validity [5, see Ch. 21 “Truth and Beauty: Validation 
and Model Testing”, pp. 845-892]. 
 
2. Theory 
 
Canzani proposes an elegant representation of the 
dependence of a CIj on another CIk in terms of the 
service provided by CIk to CIj and the effect of a 
disruption of CIk on CIj. The indices j and k refer to 
the CIs in the system of systems to be modelled; e.g., 
the index value 1 could represent ICT CI; index 2, 
could stand for Energy CI; etc. Estimates for the effect 
of a disruption of CIk on CIj have been provided in the 
Ph.D. thesis of Ana Laugé [6], see §3. 
The service provided by a given CI labelled with 
the index i, is given by: 
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𝑆𝑖(𝑡)  
= {
1, 𝑂𝑃𝑖 𝑟𝑢𝑛(𝑡) ≥ 𝐷𝐴𝑣
𝑖
𝑂𝑃𝑖 𝑟𝑢𝑛(𝑡)
𝐷𝐴𝑣
𝑖
, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
1  
where 𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑢𝑛(𝑡) represents the CI’s current running 
operations fraction of its maximum capability, and 𝐷𝐴𝑣
𝑖  
is its average demand. The function 𝑆𝑖(𝑡) is used to 
generate a relative value between 0 and 1.  
Because the breakdown rate 𝛼𝑖(𝑡) is affected by 
this function, the interdependencies of the CI are 
modelled as a formula:  
 𝛼𝑖(𝑡) =  ∑
𝑒𝑖𝑗 ∙ (1 − 𝑆
𝑗(𝑡))
|𝐽|
𝑗 ∈𝐽
 2  
The cardinality (sum of all elements in a set) of 𝐽 
represents the set of all the CIs considered. 𝑒𝑖𝑗 is a 
matrix element representing the effect CIj on CIi based 
on the Ph.D. thesis of Ana Laugé. 
 
3. Estimating CI dependencies on other 
CIs 
 
Laugé conducted a survey with CI managers to 
obtain estimates on a Likert scale for such cascading 
impacts caused by a disruption of less than two hours, 
less than six hours, less than 12 hours, less than 24 
hours, more than 24 hours and more than one week; 
she computed averages of the provided estimates 
resulting in tables for each of the cases [2, pp.169–
182]. 
The survey was formed as online questionnaires 
with the aim of analysing the CI interdependencies of 
11 CIs mentioned by [3], namely: Energy, ICT, Water, 
Food, Health, Financial, Public and legal order and 
safety, Civil administration, Transport, Chemical and 
nuclear industry, and Space and research. The survey 
was developed and executed in five concise steps, 
including a trial run, which ensured that the questions 
were well written and understandable for the 
participating experts. 
The survey was divided into three sections, where 
the first section is related to the experts taking the 
survey and they were asked to select which of the 11 
CIs they were the stewards of. Although the survey 
was sent to several experts around the world, the 
organizations the participating experts belonged to 
were predominantly Spanish. The second section is 
concerned with the measurement of interdependencies 
and the time required to recover their CI after the 
interdependent CI have recovered. The answers led to 
the conclusion that there is no standard recovery time, 
due to different equipment and procedures. 
Subsequently from this the average time to restore any 
of the 11 CI operations after a disruption, is undefined. 
The last section asked the experts to assess the effect a 
complete breakdown of a networked CI had on their 
CI. The aim with this section was to know the 
magnitude of the effects, ranging from “0 – no effect”, 
to “5 – very high effect”. This was concerning a direct 
dependency from one CI to another and the 
corresponding table values were calculated by using 
the average of the responses. 
 
4. System dynamics model 
 
System Dynamics (SD) is a methodology to build 
simulation models using computers, to study the 
behaviour of systems [4, 11]. It is an application of 
Servomechanism or Information Feedback Systems 
Theory [11] to almost all kinds of social systems. SD 
is an abstraction of the reality into a system of 
simultaneous non-linear first order differential 
equations. These equations should be solved –usually 
numerically– to reproduce the over-time behaviour of 
the system, under investigation. Our proposed SD 
model is a simple model that is an upgrade from 
Canzani’s model [2]. We have introduced several 
changes that enhanced her model like the CIs included, 
and basically addressed the three major deficiencies 
that model suffered from. In the following subsections 
we will go through the structure of our SD model 
highlighting the changes we have made, in addition to 
presenting the model validation and testing results. 
 
4.1. CI System Dynamics Model Structure 
 
In our model, a CI depends on merely two stocks 
“CI Running Operations” and “CI Down 
Operations” instead of Canzani’s three stocks. For 
any CI included in our model, the “CI Running 
Operations” stock initially contains all its correctly 
functioning operations divided by its maximum 
capability. When a failure happens to the CI, these 
operations (fraction of the CI’s maximum capability) 
will be moved via the “CI Breakdown” rate to the “CI 
Down Operations” stock. After being recovered, 
these operations return to work by being moved back 
to “CI Running Operations” via “CI Return to 
Service” rate. Figure 1 shows our model’s CI 
structure. 
Only five CIs were included in Canzani’s model, 
namely: Energy, ICT, Health, Financial, and 
Transport. To have a more comprehensive picture of 
the effect of a failed CI on other CIs, we have used the 
same CI structure for the 11 CIs included in Laugé 
surveys mentioned before. We have utilized the 
Vensim DSS subscript capability to index the same 
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structure for these 11 CIs. 
 
Figure 1: CI System Dynamics Structure 
Mathematically, the value of the “CI Running 
Operations” stock is the integration of the “CI Return 
to Service” rate minus the “CI Breakdown” rate. 
Whereas the “CI Down Operations” stock is the 
integration of the “CI Breakdown” rate minus the “CI 
Return to Service” rate. The “CI Breakdown” rate 
behaves according to the following equation: 
𝐶𝐼𝐵[𝐶𝐼𝑖] = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {
𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑂[𝐶𝐼𝑖]
𝐹𝐷𝑇
,
𝐶𝐼𝐷[𝐶𝐼𝑖] + 𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑂[𝐶𝐼𝑖]
∙ ∑ (𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑗[𝐶𝐼𝑖 , 𝐶𝐼𝑗]
𝑗 ∈𝐽
∙
1 − 𝐶𝐼𝑆𝑃[𝐶𝐼𝑗]
|𝐽|
)} 
where: 
Notation Meaning/Name in the figure 
𝐶𝐼𝐵[𝐶𝐼𝑖] 𝐶𝐼 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛[𝐶𝐼𝑖]. 
𝐶𝐼𝑖 represents any of the CIs 
included in our model. 
𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑂[𝐶𝐼𝑖] 𝐶𝐼 𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠[𝐶𝐼𝑖]. 
𝐹𝐷𝑇 𝐹𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒. 
𝐶𝐼𝐷[𝐶𝐼𝑖] 𝐶𝐼 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛[𝐶𝐼𝑖]. 
𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑗[𝐶𝐼𝑖 , 𝐶𝐼𝑗] 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝐼𝑗 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝐼𝑖 
[𝐶𝐼𝑖 , 𝐶𝐼𝑗], which is equivalent to 
𝑒𝑖𝑗 from equation 2. 
𝐶𝐼𝑗  represents all failed CIs 
affecting 𝐶𝐼𝑖, which are the 
elements of 𝐽. 
𝐶𝐼𝑆𝑃[𝐶𝐼𝑗] 𝐶𝐼 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑[𝐶𝐼𝑗], 
which is equivalent to 𝑆𝑗(𝑡) in 
equation 2. 
 
The minimum function and its first term included 
in the equation of the “CI Breakdown” rate are used 
to prevent the rate from draining the “CI Running 
Operations” stock below zero. 
The “CI Return to Service” rate is defined as: 
𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑆[𝐶𝐼𝑖] =
𝐶𝐼𝐷𝑂[𝐶𝐼𝑖]
𝐶𝐼𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑇[𝐶𝐼𝑖]
 
where: 
Notation Meaning/In the figure 
𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑆[𝐶𝐼𝑖] 𝐶𝐼 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒[𝐶𝐼𝑖]. 
𝐶𝐼𝐷𝑂[𝐶𝐼𝑖] 𝐶𝐼 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠[𝐶𝐼𝑖]. 
𝐶𝐼𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑇[𝐶𝐼𝑖] 𝐶𝐼 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑑  
 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒[𝐶𝐼𝑖]. 
 
This rate equation will move all operations inside 
the “CI Down Operations” stock back to the “CI 
Running Operations” stock over an average period 
equal to “CI Average Repair and Restore Time”, 
which is the average total time needed to restore and 
repair the failed operations as the name implies. This 
value replaces both two separate values for the total 
average repair time and the total average restore time 
in Canzani’s model. Canzani indicated that these 
values are not the focus of her work and, apparently, 
they were arbitrarily chosen. Accordingly, for 
demonstration purposes, we have arbitrarily chosen 72 
hours for this time constant. 
In Figure 1, the “CI Service Provided” represents 
𝑆𝑖(𝑡) of equation 1. In the model, this variable is 
defined as follows: 
𝐶𝐼𝑆𝑃[𝐶𝐼𝑖]  
= {
1, 𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑂[𝐶𝐼𝑖] ≥ 𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐷[𝐶𝐼𝑖]
𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑂[𝐶𝐼𝑖]
𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐷[𝐶𝐼𝑖]
, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
where: 
Notation Meaning/Name in the figure 
𝐶𝐼𝑆𝑃[𝐶𝐼𝑖] 𝐶𝐼 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑[𝐶𝐼𝑖]. 
𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑂[𝐶𝐼𝑖] 𝐶𝐼 𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠[𝐶𝐼𝑖]. 
𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐷[𝐶𝐼𝑖] 𝐶𝐼 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑[𝐶𝐼𝑖]. 
 
In our model, for demonstration purposes, the “CI 
Average Demand” was arbitrarily assumed to be 95% 
of the CI’s full capacity required to supply the demand 
of its dependent CIs. 
 
4.2. Effect on CIi from CIj 
 
In her model, Canzani used Laugé’s table of CI 
dependencies when other CIs fail for less than two 
hours only. Nevertheless, these dependencies are not 
static as such; as previously mentioned, Laugé’s thesis 
presented different tables for different disruption time 
durations. Accordingly, to include such dynamics in 
our model, we have rearranged the values of Laugé’s 
dependencies tables (see Figure 2) in separate time-
based table functions [11, Ch. 14, p. 551-595]. (Figure 
3 shows the time-based table function of the effect of 
the ICT CI failure on the Energy CI as an example.) 
These SD time-based graph functions provide a 
dynamic time-dependent values of the 𝑒𝑖𝑗 of equation 
2, or of the 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝐼𝑗  𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝐼𝑖[𝐶𝐼𝑖 , 𝐶𝐼𝑗] in 
our SD model. 
CI Service Provided
CI Average Demand
CI Running
Operations
CI Down
Operations
CI Breakdown
CI Return to Service
CI Average Repair
and Restore Time
<CI Disruption>
<Effect of CIj
Failure on CIi>
Fastest Draining
Time
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4.3. CI Disruption SD Structure 
 
CI Disruption structure, as the name implies, 
emulates a disruption happening to any of the CIs 
included in our model. Based on a pulse function 
Π (
𝑡−𝑡𝑑
Δ𝑇
) where 𝑡, 𝑡𝑑, and Δ𝑇 represent time, the 
disruption time, and the disruption duration 
respectively [13], the following equation –which is 
used by Canzani [2] as well– presents the disruption in 
CIi: 
𝐶𝐼𝐷[𝐶𝐼𝑖] = 𝐶𝐼𝐷𝑀[𝐶𝐼𝑖] ∙ Π (
𝑡 − 𝐶𝐼𝐷𝑇[𝐶𝐼𝑖]
𝐶𝐼𝐷𝐷[𝐶𝐼𝑖]
) 
where: 
Notation Meaning/Name in the figure 
𝐶𝐼𝐷[𝐶𝐼𝑖] 𝐶𝐼 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛[𝐶𝐼𝑖]. 
𝐶𝐼𝐷𝑀[𝐶𝐼𝑖] 𝐶𝐼 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒[𝐶𝐼𝑖]. 
𝐶𝐼𝐷𝑇[𝐶𝐼𝑖] 𝐶𝐼 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒[𝐶𝐼𝑖]. 
𝐶𝐼𝐷𝐷[𝐶𝐼𝑖] 𝐶𝐼 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛[𝐶𝐼𝑖]. 
Because our model has replaced the static 𝑒𝑖𝑗 with 
a time-based graph function, in addition to the model 
simulation time-line, a coexistent simulation time-line 
that starts with the onset of any disruption is needed. 
This newly generated time-line will work as an input 
to the graph function to generate the correct time-
based 𝑒𝑖𝑗 value replacement. In our model, this new 
time-line is generated inside the model variable 
𝐶𝐼 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟[𝐶𝐼𝑖] (shown in Figure 
4). Yet, to calculate this variable, the model needs to 
identify the onset of any disruption. To do so, the 
model benefits from the Vensim DSS “SAMPLE IF 
TRUE” function. This function returns its input when 
certain condition is met, and remains constant 
otherwise [14]. 
The condition that triggers this function in our 
model is the beginning of a disruption, which is 
identified via subtracting the one time-step delayed  
𝐶𝐼 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 [𝐶𝐼𝑖] from itself. As such, the 
“SAMPLE IF TRUE” function is used inside 
𝐶𝐼 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟[𝐶𝐼𝑖] (shown 
in Figure 4) to sample the value of the simulation time 
when the disruption starts. This sampled time value 
from the simulation time (done inside the model 
variable 𝐶𝐼 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟[𝐶𝐼𝑖]) as long 
as the disruption continues. Figure 4 shows the whole 
CI disruption SD structure. Figure 5 shows the original 
and one generated simulation time-lines of which 
disruption starts at hour 48 and ends 24 hours later. 
 
Figure 2: CI Dependencies when other CIs Fail for Different Durations 
 
Figure 3: Effect of CI ICT Failure on CI Energy 
over Time 
 
Figure 4: CI Disruption SD Structure 
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Figure 5: Original and Generated Simulation Time-lines 
(Disruption Starts at Hour 48) 
 
4.4. Model Testing and Validation 
 
SD model testing and validation increase 
customers trust in the model, in addition to detecting 
any problems in that model [11]. We have used what 
is applicable from the set of tests introduced by [5] and 
recommended by [11] to test and validate our model. 
Boundary adequacy test [5, 1, 11] is concerned with 
answering whether “the important concepts for 
addressing the [studied] problem [are] endogenous to 
the model” [11]. While structure assessment [1, 11] is 
concerned with answering whether the model structure 
is “consistent with relevant descriptive knowledge of 
the system” and whether the level of aggregation is 
appropriate. Our model inherited the same boundaries 
and basic structure of Canzani’s, which, although a 
simple model, includes all necessary components to 
study a CI disruption effect at this level aggregation. 
Moreover, removing the third stock of Canzani’s 
model presented a change to the structure that aims at 
making the model more consistent with the real 
system. Accordingly, the structure and aggregation 
level were found to be relevant and appropriate for the 
model purpose. 
Dimensional consistency test [5, 1, 11] checks 
whether all equation of the model are dimensionally 
consistent, maintaining that the parameters should 
have real system equivalent [11]. Using the unit check 
feature of Vensim DSS [15] assured the model 
dimensional consistency. 
Parameter assessment [5, 1, 11] is associated with 
answering whether the values of the model parameter 
are consistent with relevant descriptive and numerical 
knowledge of the system, and whether the parameters 
have real system equivalents [11]. Aside from the few 
arbitrarily chosen values clearly indicated before, all 
other parameters used in the model were retrieved 
from Laugé’s survey. 
Furthermore, the model robustness has been tested 
under extreme conditions [5, 1, 11]. Testing extreme 
conditions is concerned with answering whether “each 
equation make[s] sense even when its inputs take on 
extreme values”, and whether “the model respond 
plausibly when subjected to extreme policies, shocks, 
and parameters” [11]. Accordingly, we have utilized 
the “automatically simulate a model on changes” 
functionality of Vensim SyntheSim mode to test the 
consequences of changing model variables and 
parameters to extreme values. The usual consequence 
of changing a variable’s value to zero, as an extreme 
value for example, is several dependent equations 
failing because of division by zero. However, in other 
cases the consequence could be implausible 
behaviour. In all cases, multiple iterations of fixing the 
equations were conducted until reaching plausible 
behaviour. 
Moreover, the model was tested for integration 
error, which aims at checking whether “the results are 
sensitive to the choice of time step or numerical 
integration method” [11]. Different time step values 
and different numerical integration methods were 
tested. The combination of Euler method and time step 
of 0.125 was found suitable, as by decreasing the time 
step value and using different integration methods, the 
behaviour of model was found to be insensitive to such 
changes. In the same time, the time step was not very 
small rendering the numerical integration process 
slow. Behaviours of different variables were also 
compared under different time step, and no difference 
was noticed. 
Moreover, sensitivity analysis [5, 11], which is 
concerned with testing the robustness of the model 
under assumed uncertainties in parameters and initial 
values, was applied to the model using Vensim DSS. 
To test model sensitivity, Vensim DSS uses Monte-
Carlo simulations [13]. We have run 200 Monte-Carlo 
simulations per parameter. As no further information 
about the probability distribution of the parameters 
was available, we opted for Uniform probability 
distribution for all parameters. We did not have any 
benchmark for the numerical changes in the model 
variables due to the change in any of the tested 
parameters to test our results against. However, in all 
sensitivity tests we have conducted, we have not 
spotted any change in the modes of behaviour, 
consequently no policy implications change due to the 
change in the values of the parameters. Accordingly, 
we find the results acceptable. 
 
5. Simulation 
 
In this section we describe several simulations of 
small cyber-attacks in different conditions to fully 
understand the limits of the effect of such disruptions. 
In agreement with Canzani, we have assumed that a 
small disruption will have a magnitude equal to two. 
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5.1. Scenario 1 – a single small cyber-attack 
 
This scenario simulates a single small attack 
disruption aimed at the ICT CI which happens two 
days after the beginning of the simulation, and stays 
active for one day. We have borrowed this scenario 
from Canzani’s research [2] to show the effect of such 
a small cyber-attack for comparison purposes with 
other cyber-attack forms. 
Figure 6 shows the results of this scenario on two 
different charts, one showing the effect of the cyber-
attack on the running operations 𝑂𝑃𝑖 𝑟𝑢𝑛(𝑡) of all 11 
CIs, while the other shows the effect on the service 
provided 𝑆𝑖(𝑡) by these CIs. This single small cyber-
attack causes 41% drop in the running operations of 
the ICT CI in the third day of the simulation. The ICT 
CI could not regain 99% of its running operations until 
the 13th day. Nonetheless, the cascaded negative effect 
on other CIs’ running operations did not exceed 3.1% 
at its highest. In terms of service provided, merely the 
ICT CI was affected negatively with a 38% drop of its 
value, i.e. the attack could not be cascaded to services 
provided by other CIs. 
 
5.2. Scenario 2 – three successive small cyber-
attacks 
 
This scenario simulates three successive small 
attacks aimed at the ICT CI which happen two days 
after the beginning of the simulation time. Each attack 
stayed active for a duration of one day, and there was 
one day off in-between every two attacks. 
Figure 7 shows a large negative effect on the 
running operations of the ICT CI with a 73% drop at 
its highest in the seventh day. The ICT CI could not 
regain 99% of its running operations before the 17th 
day. The effect was cascaded to other CIs’ running 
operations and reached around 5% drop in the case of 
Water, Civil administration, and Space and research 
CIs. The drop reached around 10% for all other CIs, 
reaching 10.1% drop at its highest in the case of 
Chemical and nuclear industry CI. 
In terms of service provided, the drop in the ICT 
CI service provided exceeded 71%. This negative 
effect was not cascaded to Water, Civil administration, 
and Space and research CIs at all. However, the 
negative effect was cascaded to the service provided 
by all other CIs with 5% drop at its highest in the case 
of Public and legal order and safety, and Chemical and 
nuclear industry CIs. 
 
5.3. Scenario 3 – a single small cyber-attack 
followed by an energy failure 
 
This scenario simulates a single small attack 
disruption aimed at the ICT CI which happens 2 days 
after the beginning of the simulation, and stays active 
for one day. This cyber-attack is followed by an 
Energy CI disruption that has a magnitude of eight, 
starts four days from the simulation time, and stays 
 
Figure 6: A Single Small Cyber-attack 
 
Figure 7: Three Successive Small Cyber-attacks 
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active for a duration of one and a half days. 
Figure 8 shows the results of this scenario. Similar 
to Scenario – 1, the attack on the ICT CI dropped its 
running operations by 41% in the third day of the 
simulation. As known from Scenario – 1, the 
cascading negative effect on other CIs is very limited. 
The disruption that happened in the Energy CI caused 
the CI to completely stop working at the fifth day for 
12 hours. 
The effect of both disruptions was cascaded to 
other CIs’ running operations and reached an average 
drop of 7% in Water, Civil administration, and Space 
and research CIs, and an average drop of 14% in all 
other CIs, reaching 18.6% drop at its highest in the 
case of Chemical and nuclear industry CI. 
 
5.4. Scenario 4 – three successive small cyber-
attacks following an energy failure 
 
This scenario simulates an Energy CI disruption 
that has a magnitude of eight, starts at the beginning of 
the simulation, and keeps on for a duration of one and 
half days. This disruption is followed by three 
successive small attacks aimed at the ICT CI which 
happen two days after the beginning of the simulation, 
and having one day in-between every two attacks. 
Each attack stays active for durations of one day as 
well. 
Figure 9 shows the results of this scenario. The 
disruption that happened in the Energy CI by the 
beginning of the simulation caused the CI to 
completely stop working after one day for 12 hours. 
Moreover, similar to Scenario – 3, the cyber-attack 
causes a large negative effect on the running 
operations of the ICT CI that exceeded 76% drop at its 
highest in the seventh day (compared to 73% in 
Scenario – 3). 
The negative effect of both disruptions was 
cascaded to other CIs’ running operations and reached 
around 8% drop in Water, Civil administration, and 
Space and research CIs, and around 16% drop for all 
other CIs, reaching 20% drop at its highest in the case 
of Chemical and nuclear industry CI. 
In terms of service provided, there were a total 
drop in the Energy CI, and another drop in the ICT CI 
service provided which exceeded 74%. The negative 
effect was cascaded to the services provided by Water, 
Civil administration, and Space and research CIs with 
an average drop of 4%. Moreover, the negative effect 
was cascaded to the service provided by all other CIs 
with on average drop of 12%; and at its highest in the 
case of Chemical and nuclear industry CI with 15.8% 
drop. 
 
5.5. Scenario 5 – three successive small cyber-
attacks followed by an energy failure 
 
This scenario simulates three successive small 
 
Figure 8: A Single Small Cyber-attack Followed by an 
Energy Failure 
 
Figure 9: Three Successive Small Cyber-attacks Following 
an Energy Failure 
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attacks aimed at the ICT CI which happen two days 
after the simulation, and having one day in-between 
every two attack. Each attack stays active for durations 
of one day. These cyber-attacks are followed by an 
Energy CI disruption that has a magnitude of eight, 
starts eight days from the simulation time, and keeps 
on for a duration of one and a half days. 
Figure 10, similar to Scenario – 3, shows a large 
negative effect on the running operations of the ICT 
CI with a 73% drop at its highest in the seventh day. 
The disruption happened in the Energy CI caused the 
CI to completely stop working at the ninth day for 12 
hours. Clearly from the figure, this caused the ICT CI 
to require three more days to go back to 99% of its 
running operations compared to Scenario – 2 (not 
before the 20th day of the simulation). 
The negative effect of both disruptions was 
cascaded to other CIs’ running operations and reached 
around 10% drop in Water, Civil administration, and 
Space and research CIs, and around 18% drop for all 
other CIs, reaching 22.4% drop at its highest in the 
case of Chemical and nuclear industry CI. 
In terms of service provided, the drop in the ICT 
CI service provided exceeded 71%. This negative 
effect was cascaded to the services provided by Water, 
Civil administration, and Space and research CIs with 
an average drop of 5%. The negative effect was 
cascaded to the service provided by all other CIs with 
an average drop of 13%; at its highest in the case of 
Chemical and nuclear industry CIs with 18% drop. 
5.6. Scenarios summary 
 
Table 1 summarizes the results of all tested 
scenarios from 1 to 5. In the table, the scenarios are 
referred to by their corresponding number. 
 
Table 1: Scenarios Summary 
# 
Number 
of 
cyber-
attacks 
Energy 
disruption 
Highest 
drop in 
other CIs’ 
running 
operations 
Highest 
drop in 
other 
CIs’ 
service 
provided 
1 1 - 3.1 % 0.0 % 
2 3 - 10.1 % 5.4 % 
3 1 Yes 18.6 % 14.3 % 
4 3 Yes 20.0 % 15.8 % 
5 3 Yes 22.4 % 18.3 % 
While scenario 5 causes about 10 percent higher 
drops in CI operations, comparing Fig. 9 with 10, it is 
quite evident that the cyber attacks following the 
energy outage also prolong the duration of the outage 
and of the disruptions in other CIs. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
The approach presented in this paper combines the 
simplicity of disruption dynamics of interconnected 
Critical Infrastructures with a matrix 𝑒𝑖𝑗 encapsulating 
the complexities of the cascading effect from 
disruption originating in CIj upon CIi, where the 
indices i and j are labels for the Critical Infrastructures 
of interest. We have proceeded on the assumption that 
the approach pioneered by Laugé [6] and Laugé et al. 
[7], i.e. that the expert assessment of 𝑒𝑖𝑗 can render a 
sufficiently accurate metrics of the cascading effects, 
is viable. By “viable” we mean that a door has been 
opened for iteratively assessing such expert 
assessment with simulation results.  
Then, we wanted to investigate whether malicious 
agents could design effective attacks on Critical 
Infrastructures without needing to plan for one major 
disruption. To this effect we relied on the expert 
assessments of 𝑒𝑖𝑗 obtained by Laugé and simulated 
various scenarios. The combination of a major energy 
failure followed by three “opportunistic” small cyber-
attacks did indeed show major cascading effects. 
Massive energy failures happen occasionally; malicious 
attackers can sit on the fence and release of-the-shelf 
cyber-attacks when such failure happens. Slightly larger 
service drops, albeit of shorter duration occurred if the 
energy failure followed after a series of small cyber-
attacks. Such scenario is not unrealistic, since energy 
 
Figure 10: Three Successive Small Cyber-attacks Followed 
by an Energy Failure 
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failures occur more and more often as consequences of 
predictable extreme weather. 
It is indeed a weakness that no empirical estimates 
of the restore times are available. Not having such 
estimates, we do not emphasize the quantitative 
consequences but rather stick to the qualitative 
consequences (patterns of disruption).  
An open question is whether Laugé’s estimates of 
CI dependencies [6, 7] have general validity. In 
Laugé’s study, the organizations the participating 
experts belonged to were predominantly Spanish. To 
what extent this “Spanish” data is valid for other 
countries has not been investigated: it would require. 
duplicating Laugé’s study in other countries. On the 
other hand, critical infrastructures are reasonable 
similar across countries; hence, one would expect 
similar interdependencies in different countries rather 
than very different ones.  
A note of caution: the fact that the aggregated CI 
dependencies provided in [6, 7] are disruptive does not 
mean that organizational and behavioural effects are 
excluded in the experts’ estimates. It is a weakness that 
the estimates are “static”, in the sense of referring to 
the status quo. Hence, at the time being we lack data 
to enhance the model to explore different policies to 
mitigate the impact of disruptions. 
Finally, we wonder whether we should rejoice if 
the path sketched in this paper does lead to simple but 
accurate enough description of attack scenarios on 
Critical Infrastructures. A door would open for using 
simple tools to plan serious CI attacks.  
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